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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a data-driven approach for predicting the available Recovery Time 
(RT) of a system during a failure scenario, i.e., the time remaining until the system can 
no longer perform its function in an irreversible manner. A library of reference 
multidimensional trajectory patterns from failure scenarios is created. When a new 
failure scenario develops, its evolution pattern is compared by fuzzy similarity analysis 
to the reference multidimensional trajectory patterns. The time remaining before the 
developing trajectory pattern hits a failure threshold is predicted by combining the 
times of failure of the reference patterns, weighed by their similarity to the developing 
pattern. 
For illustration purposes, a case study of literature is considered regarding the 
estimation of the available RT in failure scenarios of the Lead Bismuth Eutectic 
eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS). 
 
Key Words: Recovery Time, Emergency Accident Management, Nuclear Power Plant, Lead-
Bismuth Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS), Fuzzy Similarity 
Analysis, Pattern Recognition. 
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1. Introduction 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Accident management involves the anticipation of paths of 
potentially dangerous behaviors, the prediction of the related effects and actions to avoid any 
undesired impact on the safety of the NPP [IAEA, 2003]. 
In case of an accident, or an initiating event that may develop into an accident, the plant 
personnel must perform various tasks before taking counteracting actions: 
• Identification of the plant state: this diagnostic task aims at identifying the cause of the 
problem and the states of a number of parameters critical for the plant operation and safety; 
• Prediction of the future development of the accident: this involves prediction of the future 
evolution of the states of the critical parameters and correspondingly of the behavior of the 
plant and its residual Recovery Time (RT) , i.e., the time available for corrective actions 
before system failure; 
• Planning of accident mitigation strategies, to be activated if safe control of the accident 
evolution were not successful. 
In modern accident management, computers and computerized procedures are useful tools 
which aid operators in the tasks of obtaining reliable information, following procedures, identifying 
plant states, predicting the future accident progression and planning accident control and mitigation 
actions. In particular, the complicated phenomena that take place in a NPP during an accident 
situation are more accessible to computerized handling than to human expert evaluation [Øwre, 
2001]. Yet, the problem of what kind of decision support to provide to nuclear power plant 
operators, in particular during transients leading up to accidents, is far from trivial [NEA, 1992; EC 
1999; USNRC, 1999; IAEA, 2003]. 
Fortunately, NPP personnel have the capability to effectively manage a broad range of 
accidents; their successful management of complex accident behaviors requires that they detect the 
occurrence of the accident, determine the extent of challenge to plant safety, monitor the 
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performance of active, passive, automatic and digital systems, select strategies to prevent or 
mitigate the safety challenge, implement the action strategies, and monitor their effectiveness. The 
capability to effectively carry out these tasks during an accident is influenced by the availability of 
timely and accurate plant status information and the awareness of the RT after the detection of the 
fault. Poor decisions may be taken because of an assumed short time available for sorting out the 
information relevant to the plant status [Glasstone et al., 1998]; on the contrary, timely and correct 
decisions can prevent an event from developing into a severe accident or mitigate its undesired 
consequences. 
The existing computer-based tools which can aid accident management can be categorized 
according to their complexity and specific application purpose [IAEA, 2003]: 
• Compact simulators; 
• Plant analyzers; 
• Full-scope training simulators; 
• Multifunctional simulators; 
• Severe accident simulators; 
• Accident management support tools. 
In particular, the accident management support tools combine tracking and predictive 
simulators. The former ones monitor the plant status and provide calculated values also of those 
parameters that are not directly observable by the monitoring systems. The predictive simulators 
must be fast-running so as to allow on-line prediction of  the accident progression and of the effects 
of the planned mitigation strategies [IAEA, 2003]. 
The critical point of predictive simulators is the speed of computation, to provide real time 
information. This of course depends on the level of detail included in the plant modeling and on the 
computer power available. 
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One of the main quantities of interest to be delivered by predictive simulators for accident 
management use is the available RT. Approaches to RT prediction can be categorized broadly into 
model-based and data-driven [Chiang et al., 2001]. Model-based approaches attempt to incorporate 
physical models of the system into the estimation of the RT. However, uncertainty due to the 
assumptions and simplifications of the adopted models may pose significant limitations. Moreover, 
the requirement of high computational speed for on line response necessarily leads to limited details 
in the phenomena modeled, with consequent limited accuracy in the representation of the actual 
plant behavior [Berglund et al., 1995; Serrano et al., 1999]. On the contrary, data-driven techniques 
utilize monitored operational data related to system health. They can be beneficial when 
understanding of first principles of system operation is not straightforward or when the system is so 
complex that developing an accurate model is prohibitively expensive. Data-driven approaches can 
often be deployed quickly and cheaply, and still provide wide coverage of system behavior. An 
added value of data-driven techniques is their ability to transform high-dimensional noisy data into 
lower dimensional information useful for decision-making [Dragomir et al., 2007]. 
Data-driven approaches can be divided into two categories: statistical techniques (regression 
methods, ARMA models, etc.) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques (neural networks, fuzzy 
logic systems, etc.). 
With respect to AI techniques, Neural Networks (NNs) and Fuzzy Logic (FL) techniques 
have gained considerable attention in the past few years, due to their ability to deal with the 
uncertainties and non-linearities of the real processes, especially in abnormal conditions [Øwre, 
2001]. Successful prediction models have been constructed based on Neural Networks [Barlett et 
al., 1992; Campolucci et al., 1999; Peel et al., 2008; Zio et al., 2008; Santosh et al., 2009] and 
Neuro-Fuzzy (NF) systems [Wang et al., 2004]. In spite of the recognized power of neural network 
modeling techniques, skepticism against their use in safety-critical applications relates to their 
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black-box character which limits intuition with respect to the understanding of their performance 
[Wang et al., 2008]. 
An opportunity for increased transparency and openness of data-driven models is offered by 
fuzzy logic methods, which are increasingly proposed in modern control and diagnostic 
technologies. Based on the principles of Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory, fuzzy logic provides a formal 
mathematical framework for dealing with the vagueness of everyday reasoning [Zadeh, 1965]. As 
opposed to binary reasoning based on ordinary set theory, within the fuzzy logic framework 
measurement uncertainty and estimation imprecision can be properly accommodated [Yuan et al., 
1997; Zio et al., 2005]. 
The goal of this work is to extend to the multidimensional case an approach previously 
presented by the authors for the prediction of the available RT during an accident [Zio et al., 2009]. 
The extension is necessary for dealing with realistic cases of accident management. The 
multidimensional computational framework for the on-line prediction of the system available RT 
considers a set of multidimensional trajectory patterns arising from different system failures 
(hereafter called reference trajectory patterns) and uses a fuzzy-based, data-driven similarity 
analysis for predicting the RT of a newly developing failure trajectory (hereafter called test 
trajectory pattern). A novelty of the proposed computational framework lies in the reliance on a 
fuzzy definition of multidimensional trajectory pattern similarity to capture and integrate the 
ambiguous information carried by the measured signals. More specifically, the pattern matching 
process is based on a fuzzy evaluation of the distance between the signals of the multidimensional 
test pattern and the patterns of reference [Angstenberger, 2001]; the fuzzy distances from all 
reference patterns are then combined to transform the multidimensional data into a one-dimensional 
similarity indicator, which is used in the prediction of the available RT. 
An application is presented with reference to the dynamic failure scenarios of the Lead 
Bismuth Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS) with digital 
Instrumentation and Control (I&C) [Cammi et al., 2006]. Keeping the focus on RT prediction, the 
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analysis does not cover the study of the software and its possible failure modes, the benefits of fault 
tolerant features, the interactions of the software with the hardware and human components. In 
other words, the dynamic failure scenario modeling is tailored to the purpose of showing the 
feasibility of effectively estimating the RT during an accident. The actual implementation of the 
method in a qualified tool of accident management will require full dynamic accident calculations, 
inclusive of comprehensive models of hardware, software and human failure modes and their 
interactions. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the 
computational algorithm for the multidimensional fuzzy data similarity evaluation and the 
associated RT prediction. Section 3 presents the mechanistic model of the LBE-XADS, with the 
description of the monitored signals. In Section 4, the results of the application of the approach to 
LBE-XADS failure scenarios are presented. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
2. Methodology 
It is assumed that N trajectories (reference trajectory patterns) are available, representative 
of the evolution of relevant signals during reference failure scenarios. These trajectories last all the 
way to system failure, i.e., to the time when anyone of the signals reaches the threshold value 
beyond which the system loses its functionality. 
When a failure scenario is developing in the system, its multidimensional signal trajectory 
(test trajectory pattern) is compared for similarity with the N multidimensional reference trajectory 
patterns stored in the database and the residual lifes of these are used to estimate the RT available in 
the developing failure scenario [Angstenberger, 2001]. 
Figure 1 shows a schematics of the computational framework in the general case of 
multidimensional trajectories of Z monitored signals ( )1 2, ,..., ,Zf x x x t . 
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Figure 1 The flowchart of the fuzzy based data-driven approach
8 
 
 
For illustration, the procedure is here followed step by step: 
- Step 1: fault detection. The Z-dimensional trajectory of signals ( )1 2, ,..., ,Zf x x x t  is 
continuously monitored throughout the time horizon of observation T , starting from 
(discrete) time 1t = ; at each discrete time t , its values are recorded and appended to the 
matrix of the values collected at the previous time steps. For reasons which will become 
clear in the following, the database containing the reference trajectory patterns is organized 
in a 3-D structure [ ]N k ZR × × , where 
Tk
n
=  and its generic element ( ), ,r i j z  is the projection 
on the z-th signal axis of ( ),r i j  which is the j-th segment of length n  of values of the i-th 
reference trajectory, 1,2,...,i N= , 1, 2,...,j k= , 1, 2,...,z Z= , normalized in the range 
[0.2,0.8]. For clarity’s sake, in Figures 2 and 3 a 2-D reference trajectory and its partition 
into 15 elements  are shown, respectively (i.e., Z=2 and k=15). As long as no abnormal 
signal deviation is detected, the system is qualified as working in nominal conditions and the 
estimate  ( )RT t  of the available recovery time made at the generic time t  is taken equal to 
the system Mean Time to Failure ( )MTTF t , obtained from the available recovery time 
( )iRT t  of all the failure trajectories in the reference library: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )| |
1 1
| | | |if fi ii i
f i
i t t i t tf f
RT t MTTF t t t RT t
i t t i t t> >
= = − =
> >
∑ ∑  (1) 
where 
ift  is the system failure time along the i-th trajectory (i.e., the time when the signal 
value exceeds the threshold beyond which the system loses its functionality), ( )| | ifi t t>  is 
the cardinality of the set of reference trajectories whose failure time is larger than t  and 
( )iRT t  is their residual life starting from t . At the following time steps, the algorithm 
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continues to update the estimate of  ( ) ( )RT t MTTF t= , until a fault is detected upon a 
deviation of the signal outside its range of allowed variability; at this time, the algorithm for 
the estimation of the available RT starts matching the similarity of the developing signal 
trajectory evolution to those in the reference library, and combining their failure times to 
provide an estimate of the available RT. 
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Figure 2 A bidimensional reference trajectory 
on a time horizon T=3000 [s] 
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Figure 3 Bidimensional reference trajectory of Figure 2 
partitioned into k=15 segments of length n=3000/15=200 [s], 
j=1,2,…,15
 
- Step 2: pointwise difference computation of multidimensional trajectory patterns. At the 
current time t, the latest n-long segment of values of the test trajectory pattern 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2, ,..., , , ,..., , 1, 2,...,Z Zf x x x t f x x x t n t n t= − + − +ɶ  is normalized in [0.2,0.8]. The 
pointwise difference ( )δ i  between the n·Z values of pattern ( )1 2, ,..., ,Zf x x x tɶ  and those of 
the generic reference trajectory segment ( ), ,r i j z , is computed: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
, , , ,
Z
z
z
i j f x t r i j zδ
=
= −∑ ɶ , 1,2,...,i N= , 1, 2,...,j k= , 1, 2,...,z Z=  (2) 
r (i,1) 
r (i,15) 
r (i,5) 
… 
… 
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The matrix [ ]N kδ ×  contains the difference measures ( ),i jδ  between all n-long segments of 
the Z-dimensional reference trajectories and the test trajectory pattern of the monitored 
signals. 
- Step 3: computation of trajectory pointwise similarity and corresponding distance score. 
Classically, similarity is decided crisply: depending on whether the distance or similarity 
measure between two objects exceeds a specified threshold, the objects are classified into 
distinct categories of ‘similar’ or ‘non-similar’ [Angstenberger, 2001]. Such binary 
classification is restrictive when the situation is not so clear-cut and imprecision and 
uncertainty in similarity classification exist [Zimmermann et al., 1985]. In practice, there are 
numerous cases in which the similarity measure should allow for a gradual transition 
between ‘similar’ and ‘non-similar’ [Binaghi et al., 1993; Joentgen et al., 1999]. This can be 
achieved by resorting to a fuzzy logic modeling paradigm in which the pointwise difference 
of two trajectories is judged for similarity with respect to an “approximately zero” fuzzy set 
(FS) specified by a function which maps the elements ( ),i jδ  of the difference matrix [ ]N kδ ×  
into their values ( ),i jµ  of membership to the condition of “approximately zero”. The 
distance score ( ),d i j  between two trajectory segments is then computed as: 
 ( ) ( ), 1 ,d i j i jµ= − , 1,2,...,i N= , 1, 2,...,j k=  (3) 
Common membership functions can be used for the definition of the FS, e.g. triangular, 
trapezoidal, and bell-shaped [Dubois et al., 1988]. In the application illustrated in this work, 
the following bell-shaped function is used: 
 ( )
( ) ( )22
ln
,
,
i j
i j e
α δβµ
 −
−  
 
=  (4) 
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The arbitrary parameters α  and β  can be set by the analyst to shape the desired 
interpretation of similarity into the fuzzy set: the larger the value of the ratio ( )2ln αβ
−
, the 
narrower the fuzzy set and the stronger the definition of similarity [Zio et al., 2009]. The 
choice of the values of α  and β  depends on the application; one may proceed to 
determining the value β  of the difference value δ  which must have a degree of 
membership µ  equal to α  [Angstenberger, 2001] 
- Step 4: weight definition. The  ( )RT t  is estimated as a similarity-weighted sum of the 
( )iRT t : 
 
 ( ) ( )
fi
i i
i t t
RT t w RT t
>
= ⋅∑ , 1,2,...,i N=  (5) 
The ideas behind the weighting of the individual ( )iRT t  is that: i) all failure trajectories in 
the reference library bring useful information for determining the available RT of the 
trajectory currently developing; ii) those segments of the reference trajectories which are 
most similar to the most recent segment of length n  of the currently developing failure 
trajectory should be more informative in the extrapolation of the occurring trajectory to 
failure. 
To assign the weight iw , the minimum distance 
*
id  along the i
th
 row of the matrix of 
Eq. (3) is first identified: 
 ( )* 1,...,min ,i j kd d i j== , 1,2,...,i N=  (6) 
The weight iw  is then computed as: 
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 ( ) *
1
*1
id
i iw d e
β
 
− 
 
= − ⋅ , 1,2,...,i N=  (7) 
and normalized: 
 
1
N
i i e
e
w w w
=
= ∑  (8) 
Note that the smaller the minimum distance the larger the weight given to the i-th trajectory 
[Zio et al., 2009]. 
- Step 5: RTi(t) and RT(t) estimation. With respect to the generic i-th trajectory in the library 
for which 
ift t> , the value ( )iRT t  is determined as: 
 ( )
i Mi f jRT t t t= − , 1,2,...,i N=  (9) 
where ( )( )( )*max arg ,Mj ijt n i j dδ= ⋅ =  is the final time index of the latest-in-life segment of 
the i-th trajectory among those with minimum distance *id  from the developing test 
trajectory (n is the test trajectory pattern length and ( )( )( )*max arg , ij i j dδ =  gives the 
largest column index j of ( ),r i i  whose element is equal to *id ). Thus, ( )iRT t  is the time 
available before reaching the failure threshold on the reference trajectory starting from the 
end time of the latest-in-life segment of minimum distance from the developing trajectory 
(Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 The ( )iRT t  for the i-th bidimensional reference trajectory starts from the end time of the latest-in-life segment of 
minimum distance from the occurring trajectory 
 
This allows a conservative RT estimation, biased towards “pessimistic” predictions of the 
available RT, because in the case that more than one segment along the i-th reference 
trajectory is closest to the developing test trajectory, the latest one is taken, i.e., the one 
closest to failure. 
Then, the estimate  ( )RT t  of the remaining useful life along the developing trajectory is 
simply computed as in Eq. (5), with weights iw  evaluated by Eq. (8). 
 
3. The LBE-XADS 
The Lead-Bismuth Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS) is a 
sub-critical, fast reactor in which the fission process for providing thermal power ( )P t  is sustained 
by an external neutron source through spallation reaction by a proton beam ( )Q t  accelerated by a 
synchrotron on a lead-bismuth eutectic target [Bowman et al., 1992; Carminati et al., 1993; Rubbia 
et al., 1995; Van Tuyle et al., 1993; Venneri et al., 1993]. A simplified scheme of the plant is 
sketched in Figure 5. The primary cooling system is of pool-type with Lead-Bismuth Eutectic 
n-long developing  
test trajectory 
ift
 
r (i,1) 
r (i,15) 
r (i,5) 
… 
… 
… 
( )iRT t  
Latest in-life 
reference 
segment with 
minimum 
distance 
Mjt
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(LBE) liquid metal coolant leaving the top of the core, at full power nominal conditions, at 
temperature ,C PLBτ  equal to 400 °C and then re-entering the core from the bottom through the down-
comer at temperature ,P CLBτ  equal to 300 °C. The average in-core temperature of the LBE ,av CLBT  is 
taken as the mean of ,C PLBτ  and ,P CLBτ . The secondary cooling system is a flow of an organic 
diathermic oil at 290-320 °C, at full power conditions. Cooling of the diathermic oil in each loop is 
obtained through an air flow ( )a tΓ  provided by three air coolers connected in series. 
 
Figure 5 LBE-XADS simplified schematics. A = Accelerator; C = core; P = primary heat exchanger; S = secondary heat 
exchanger 
 
A dedicated, dynamic simulation model has been implemented in SIMULINK for providing 
a simplified, lumped and zero-dimensional description of the coupled neutronic and thermo-
hydraulic evolution of the system [Cammi et al., 2006]. The model allows the simulation of the 
system controlled dynamics as well as of the free dynamics when the control module is deactivated 
and the air cooler flow is kept constant. 
Both feedforward and feedback digital control schemes have been adopted for the operation 
of the system. The control is set to keep a steady state value of approximately 300 °C of the average 
temperature of the diathermic oil ,av SoT : this value represents the optimal working point of the 
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diathermic oil at the steady state, full nominal power of 80 MWth. On the contrary, an oil 
temperature beyond the upper threshold ,th uoT =340 °C would lead to degradation of its physical and 
chemical properties, whereas a temperature below the lower threshold ,th loT =280 °C could result in 
thermal shocks for the primary fluid and, eventually, for the structural components [Cammi et al., 
2006]. Conservatively, no dependence on the duration of exposition to temperatures beyond the 
threshold values has been assumed: in other words, the system is considered to fail at such 
temperatures regardless of the time during which it exceeds the thresholds. 
Multiple component failures can occur during the system life. To simulate this, the model 
has been embedded within a Monte Carlo (MC) sampling procedure for injecting faults at random 
times and of random magnitudes. Samples of component failures are drawn within a mission time 
of 3000 [s]. The set of faults considered are: 
• The PID controller fails stuck, with a random flow rate output value 1m  sampled from a 
uniform distribution in [0,797] [kg/s]. 
• The air coolers fail stuck in a random position that provides a corresponding air flow mass 
2m  uniformly distributed in [0,1000] [kg/s]. 
• The feedforward controller fails stuck with a corresponding flow rate value 3m  uniformly 
distributed in [0,797] [kg/s]. 
• The communication between air coolers actuators and PID controller fails so that the PID is 
provided with the same input value of the previous time step. 
The first three faults are applicable to both analog and digital systems, whereas the last one is 
typical of digital systems. Furthermore, the fault magnitude probability distributions are assumed to 
be uniform, even if the components may more likely fail in a certain mode than in others. This 
includes also rare multiple events in the set of failure scenarios and further tests the robustness of 
the RT prediction procedure. 
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The sequence of multiple failures is generated by sampling the first failure time from the 
uniform distribution [0,3000] [s] and the successive failure times from the conditional distributions, 
uniform from the last sampled time to 3000 [s]. This assumption is conservative, favoring larger 
number of failures in the sequence. 
The evolution of the failure scenarios may lead to three different end states, within the 
mission time of 3000 [s]: 
1. Low-temperature failure mode ( ,av SoT < ,th loT ) 
2. Safe mode ( ,th loT < ,av SoT < ,th uoT ) 
3. High-temperature failure mode ( ,av SoT > ,th uoT ) 
The following three signals are taken for the estimation of the available RT: 
• Mean in-core LBE temperature, ,av CLBT  
• Mean oil temperature of the secondary heat exchanger hot side , ,av SoT  
• Mean air flow rate at the secondary heat exchanger cold side, ( )a tΓ  
It is important to underline that the procedure implemented in this work for sampling the fault 
events is not intended to reproduce the actual stochastic failure behavior of the system components; 
rather, the choices and hypotheses for modeling the faults (i.e., the mission time, the number and 
typology of faults, the distributions of failure times and magnitudes) have been arbitrarily made 
with the aim of favoring multiple failures. In any case, the components considered subjected to fault 
and their types are not intended to provide a comprehensive description of the system fault behavior 
but are only taken as exemplary for generating the dynamic failure scenarios to be used as reference 
and test patterns. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Application of the procedure for RT(t) prediction 
A database of Z=3-dimensional reference trajectories (i.e., ,av CLBT , ,av SoT  and aΓ (t)) for N = 
6400 failure scenarios (differing in faulty components, time of faults occurrence and faults 
magnitude) is organized in the reference structure [ ]N k ZR × × , where Tk
n
= =30. The generic element 
( ), ,r i j z  of the reference structure will be compared for similarity with the z-th signal of the test 
trajectory pattern containing the values of the latest 100 time steps of the trajectory. For each of the 
test trajectories the procedural steps are performed as follows: 
Step 1: fault detection. 
The signal ( )1 2 3, , ,f x x x t  is monitored starting from time 1t =  [s] to the mission time T = 
3000 [s], with time steps of 1 [s]. At each time step t , its value is appended and stored in the matrix 
containing the 1n − =99 values of the 3 signals collected at the previous times. The Mean Time to 
Failure ( )MTTF t  is calculated resorting to Eq. (1) and  ( )RT t  is set equal to ( )MTTF t  for each 
time step, until any component failure is detected; the fault detection activates the on-line fuzzy-
based data-driven algorithm for RT prediction. 
Step 2: pointwise difference computation of multidimensional trajectory patterns. 
The total pointwise difference ( ),i jδ  is evaluated by resorting to Eq. (2), with z=1,2,3. 
Step 3: computation of trajectory pointwise similarity and corresponding distance score. 
The pointwise differences ( ),i jδ  are mapped into values of membership ( ),i jµ  of the 
“approximately zero” FS. The bell-shaped function of Eq. (4) is taken with parameters values 
0.2α =  and 0.01β = , implying strong sharpness in the FS and thus in the similarity requirement. 
The distance scores ( ),d i j  are then computed by Eq. (3), 1, 2,...,6400i = , 1, 2,...,30j = . 
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Step 4: weight definition. 
The minimum distances *id  are evaluated (Eq. (6)), and the relative normalized weights iw  
calculated through Eqs. (7) and (8), 1, 2,...,6400i = . 
Step 5: RTi(t) and RT(t) estimation. 
For each reference trajectory in the library, an estimate  ( )iRT t  for the test trajectory is 
computed (Eq. (9), 1, 2,...,6400i = ); then, the ( )iRT t  are aggregated in the weighted sum (Eq. (5)) 
with the weights iw  previously calculated. 
The estimates of the ( )MTTF t  for five 3-D test pattern trajectories taken from [Zio et al., 
2009] are plotted in Figures 6-10, in thin continuous lines with the bars of one standard deviation of 
the samples ( )|i if ft t t t− > , where ift  is the time at which the diathermic oil temperature profile of 
the i-th reference trajectory exceeds either thresholds ,th uoT  or ,th loT , with corresponding system loss 
of functionality. The  ( )RT t  estimates obtained based on trajectory segments of 100n =  [s] are 
plotted in bold circles; at the beginning of the test trajectories, the predictions match the ( )MTTF t ; 
then, once a component failure is detected, the  ( )RT t  estimate moves away from the ( )MTTF t  
values towards the real RT(t) (dashed thick line). In the Figures, the bold vertical line indicates the 
time of diathermic oil threshold exceedance. Notice that none of the estimates exceeds the actual 
failure time. 
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Figure 6 RT estimation for a trajectory belonging to the low-
temperature failure mode  
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Figure 7 RT estimation for a trajectory belonging to the low-
temperature failure mode 
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Figure 8 RT estimation for a trajectory belonging to the 
high-temperature failure mode 
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Figure 9 RT estimation for a trajectory belonging to the 
high-temperature failure mode
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Figure 10 RT estimation for a trajectory which does not exceed any safety threshold value, although a failure sequence has 
occurred 
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4.2 Performance evaluation of the RT(t) estimation procedure 
The performance of the available RT estimation procedure has been tested extensively on a 
batch of P=1280 multidimensional test trajectories, different from the reference trajectories. Figure 
11 shows the  ( )RT t  predictions (continuous line with dark bullets) compared to the actual 
remaining lives for 25 failure trajectories (graphically appended in sequence), after the fault has 
been detected (i.e., starting from step 2 of the algorithm). After fault detection, the initial 
predictions for each test trajectory tend to be similar, regardless of the eventual length of the test 
trajectory life duration because the initial deviation from the nominal evolution is little sensitive and 
only slightly moves the ( )RT t  prediction away from the ( )MTTF t  value; this results in a 
conservative trend of initial anticipation of the available RT associated to trajectories whose failure 
actually occurs late in life. The largest available RT estimation errors occur for those trajectories in 
which the component failure is of low-magnitude, whose effect only slowly drives the system to 
failure and the prediction away from ( )MTTF t  towards the true ( )RT t . 
To globally quantify the performance of the procedure, the mean relative error (RE) at time 
t, between the estimate  ( )RT t  and its true value ( )RT t , is introduced: 
 ( )
 ( ) ( )
( )1
1 P p p
p p
RT t RT t
RE t
P RT t
=
−
= ∑  (10) 
where ( )pRT t  is the actual available recovery time at time t of test pattern p, and  ( )pRT t  its 
estimate, 1, 2,...,p P= . 
Figure 12 shows the empirical probability density function of the mean relative error 
evaluated along 3000 [s] of evolution of the 1280 test trajectories. The distribution is skewed 
towards small error values, with mean and median equal to 0.07 and 0.02, respectively. This proves 
that the procedure most frequently makes small relative estimation errors. 
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The computational time required for the estimation along one complete test trajectory of 3000 [s] is 
of few seconds on an Intel® Celeron M of 900 MHz. 
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Figure 11 Predicted and actual remaining life for 25 test failure scenarios 
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Figure 12 Empirical probability density function of the relative errors on the 3000 [s] of the 1280 test trajectories 
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Figure 13 compares the RE evaluated at time steps of 50 [s] in the last 600 [s] when all three 
monitored signals are used or when only the mean LBE temperature is used [Zio et al., 2009] with 
0.01β =  in Eqs. (4) and (7). It is seen that: 
- the accuracy in the estimation is worst when using only the mean LBE temperature; 
- the accuracy in the estimation of the available RT improves over time: as the available RT 
decreases, the relative errors approximate their mean values of 0.02 and 0.05, respectively. 
- the accuracy in the estimation of the available RT when all 3 monitored signals are used 
never exceeds a RE value of 0.1. 
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Figure 13 Relative Error evaluated each 50 [s] starting from 600 [s] before failure, for 1280 test trajectories, using all three 
monitored signals (squares) or only the mean LBE temperature (circles) 
 
Figure 14 shows the RE evaluated at time steps of 50 [s] in the last 600 [s] for different 
groups of the three simultaneously monitored signals with 0.01β =  in Eqs. (4) and (7); the smaller 
number of monitored signals used for the pattern similarity evaluation, the worse the accuracy in 
the estimation of the available RT but the larger the savings in computing times. In the case of only 
1 monitored signal, the performances for LBE temperature and oil temperature are almost the 
same; the performance for air flow signal is much worse than those for LBE and oil temperature, 
whose values evolving in time are a consequence of an overall contribution of the parameters t1, t2, 
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t3, t4, m1 and m2; on the contrary, after a failure directly affecting the air flow, since its value is 
stuck to m3, this signal loses any physical meaning related to the system behavior without carrying 
any additional information for the RT prediction. 
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Figure 14 Relative Error evaluated each 50 [s] starting from 600 [s] before failure, for 1280 test trajectories, using different 
combinations of the three monitored signals 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper extends to the multidimensional case a similarity-based prediction method for 
estimating the available Recovery Time (RT) of a system, as a computerized support tool to be 
embedded in an operator support system for emergency accident management. The capability of the 
staff to effectively carry out corrective actions is directly influenced by the availability of the 
information about the RT after the detection of the fault. In fact, poor decisions may be taken 
because of the supposed short time available for sorting out the relevant information; on the 
contrary, timely and correct decisions can prevent an event from developing into a severe accident 
or mitigate its undesired consequences. 
The extended method of RT prediction allows for the consideration of the information 
carried out by multiple signals of multidimensional trajectories. Data from different transient failure 
scenarios are used to create a library of reference patterns of evolution; for estimating the available 
24 
 
RT of a test pattern, its evolution data are matched to the patterns in the library and their known 
residual life times are used for the estimation, based on a multidimensional fuzzy pointwise 
similarity concept. 
The RT estimation procedure involves four main steps: (1) computing the pointwise 
difference between test and reference patterns; (2) evaluating their multidimensional fuzzy 
pointwise similarity and distance score; (3) defining the weights of the individual RT estimates 
provided by the reference patterns; and (4) aggregating these to evaluate the system residual RT. 
A literature case study regarding the RT prediction for a large number of fault scenarios of 
the Lead Bismuth Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS) has 
demonstrated the promising potential of the computational procedure and the improvements in 
prediction accuracy obtained by extending it to multidimensional pattern analysis. The results are 
very satisfactory from the point of view of both accuracy of the estimation and computing time; 
these are two objectives which can be optimized by a proper selection of the monitored signals upon 
which to base the pointwise similarity evaluation. The procedure may be used to allow predicting 
the available RT with sufficient accuracy and timing for proactive maintenance/safety procedures 
purposes. 
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